

#1 - MacArthur's "Blank Check," September 30, 1950

After the successful invasion at Inchon, MacArthur was ordered by the White House and the UN to cross the 38th parallel and take the war into North Korea. He is told to feel "unhampered" and to win the war.

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PERSONAL FOR

FLASH

30 September 1950

PERSONAL FROM : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PERSONAL FOR : GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SENDS

Reference present report of supposed announcement by Eighth Army that ROK Divisions would halt on 38th parallel for regrouping: We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel. Announcement above referred to may precipitate embarrassment in UN where evident desire is not to be confronted with necessity of a vote on passage of 38th parallel, rather to find you have found it militarily necessary to do so.

Signed G. C. Marshall

MCN: 82543

TOO: 292055 Z (300555 I)

TOR: 292117 Z (300655 I)

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS-GCS DECLASSIFICATION
WORKING GROUP
DATE: 6 Jun 71



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C- 65034 refers.
JCS 93079 refers

#2 - The "Gag Order," December 6, 1950

Communist China enters the Korean War and begins to fight against US/UN forces at the end of October 1950. Newspapers blame MacArthur for provoking China by crossing the 38th parallel. The White House remains quiet so MacArthur defends himself publicly by noting he was ordered to cross into North Korea. In response, the White House orders that no public statements about foreign policy or military policy be released without approval from the Department of the Army.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WG/ef

~~Confidential~~
PRIORITY



DECLASSIFIED PER JCS LTR OF
20 AUG. 75

6 Dec 50

FROM : DEPTAR (TAG) WASH DC

TO : CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN, CHIEF AFF FT MONROE VA, CG USARPAC
FT SHAFTER TH, CG ARMY ONE GOVERNORS ISLAND NY, CG ARMY
TWO FT GEORGE MEADE MD, CG ARMY THREE FT MCPHERSON GA,
CG ARMY FOUR FT SAM HOUSTON TEXAS, CG ARMY FIVE CHICAGO
ILLINOIS, CG ARMY SIX PRESIDIO OF SPRAN CALIF

NR : W 98126

Following instructions received from White House: In view of the present international situation, and until further notification no speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy or military policy will be released without clearance from the Department of the Army. Oversea Army Commanders will exercise extreme caution in public statements, will clear all but routine statements with the Department of the Army and will refrain from direct communication on foreign or military policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States. Purpose of above not intended to curtail flow of information to American people but to assure that information released is in accord with policies of United States Government. Expeditious notification to all subordinate commands is desired.

WITSELL

ACTION : SECY GEN STAFF

INFORMATION : COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF

DECLASSIFIED PER *JCS Ltr of 20 Aug 75*

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PRIORITY

~~Confidential~~

TOO : 060452 Z
MCN : 99621

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No.

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#3 – MacArthur's Letter to Congressman Joseph W. Martin, March 20, 1951

Congressman Martin wrote to MacArthur asking his opinion on the Korean War. MacArthur responded with this letter and made some comments critical of the president's policy on Korea. Martin made this letter public. The White House was furious and many of the president's advisors decided it was time to remove MacArthur.

20 March 1951

General MacArthur sent the following letter to Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., which was released in Washington by Mr. Martin:

"Dear Congressman Martin:

"I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12th. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old time punch.

"My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter-force as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition.

"It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.

"With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am,

"Faithfully yours,

"DOUGLAS MacARTHUR."



#4 - Official US Policy on War, March 21, 1951

Despite the initial "Blank Check" that MacArthur was given, China's entrance into the war spooks the United Nations. Soon, the White House and the UN are both leaning towards a diplomatic solution to the war instead of an outright victory. They fear continued war could result in a nuclear World War III.

CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND AND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

~~TOP SECRET~~
INCOMING MESSAGE

EHD/jdd

~~TOP SECRET~~
PRIORITY

21 Mar 51

FROM : DEPTAR (FROM JCS) WASH DC
TO : CINCPAC TOKYO JAPAN
NR : JCS 86276

State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort towards settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th Parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with the enemy. Your recommendations desired.

NO SIG

ACTION : SEC GEN STAFF

INFORMATION : COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS-CCS DECLASSIFICATION
WORKING GROUP
DATE-- 6 Jan 71



82296

PRIORITY

TOO : 201834 Z
MCN : 81188

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

~~TOP SECRET~~
Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

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COPY No.

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#5 – MacArthur's Press Release on Korean War, March 24, 1951 (2 Pages)

In contrast to the White House and the UN, MacArthur opposes a diplomatic solution. He emphasizes the success of his forces and their ability to end the conflict on the Korean Peninsula once and for all. He also expresses a fear that the diplomatic solution would reward communist China with a seat at the UN.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
Public Information Office

Tokyo, Japan
24 March 1951

Press Release:

General MacArthur left Tokyo this morning to visit the Korean battle front. Before his departure he issued the following statement on the military situation in Korea:

"Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations. This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics have definitely failed him as our own forces have become seasoned to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contributing to his piecemeal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under the rigors of climate, terrain and battle.

"Of even greater significance than our tactical successes has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war. He lacks the manufacturing base and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns. Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset the vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the sea and the air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past. When this control exists as in our case, and is coupled with an inferiority of ground fire power as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss.



"These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under the inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea. The enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits, without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa or China's seat in the United Nations.

"The Korean nation and people, which have been so cruelly ravaged, must not be sacrificed. That is a paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere. Within the area of my authority as the military commander, however, it should be needless to say that I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the Commander-in-Chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.

"DOUGLAS MacARTHUR."



#6 - Truman's Press Release on Firing of MacArthur, April 11, 1951

Truman praises MacArthur's military service but explains that he has removed him from command because MacArthur was not supporting the policies of the US Government or the UN when it came to his official duties.

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 April 1951


PERSONAL FOR

FLASH

PERSONAL FROM: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (PERSONAL FROM GENERAL BRADLEY)

PERSONAL FOR : GENERAL MACARTHUR

NUMBER : JCS 88181, 11 April 1951



Following statement is being released by the President:

"With deep regret, I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free Democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason, I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case. Signed Harry S. Truman."

MCN: 85876

TOO: 110522Z (111422I)

TOR: 110610Z (111510I)

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS-CCS DECLASSIFICATION
WORKING GROUP
DATE 6 Jan 75

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PERSONAL FOR

"PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED.
CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING."

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8 US CONSTITUTION, Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1

Truman has the authority to remove MacArthur from command. As President of the United States, he is Commander in Chief of the military.

“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States...”

9 – US Public Opinion Data from April 1951, Gallup Polling

At the time, most American's disagreed with Truman's decision to fire MacArthur. There was a divide however between the elites and the general public however. Among the "Who's Who" – business and political leaders, there was more support for Truman's decision.

Reactions to MacArthur's Dismissal in 1951 Differed Along Cultural Lines

Do you approve or disapprove of President Truman's action in removing Gen. MacArthur?

	"Who's Who"	General public
	%	%
Approve	51	25
Disapprove	46	66
No opinion	3	9

GALLUP, APRIL 16-21, 1951

10 – MacArthur's Thoughts on Korea – from his 1964 autobiography *Reminiscences*.

MacArthur greatly feared that a limited war in Korea – one that did not bring about victory and a stable peace for the Korean Peninsula – would merely place the problem of a Korean crisis on future generations. He was also concerned about the rise of communist China as a superpower.

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But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory—not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory.

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. For history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified that means—where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands, until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the

only alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer. Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. For China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that as military action is confined to its territorial limits, it condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment, while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation. Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against Communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were, "Don't scuttle the Pacific."